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The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law

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  • Gratton, Gabriele

Abstract

This paper explores the role played by press regulation in selecting the information mass media deliver to voters. The focus is on whether press regulation can reduce political corruption and increase voters' welfare. By endogenizing the response of the voters to information from the media, we clarify under which circumstances regulation reduces or increases corruption. We show that punitive laws can reduce political corruption only if the moral hazard problem dominates adverse selection and the punishment is large enough to deter the publication of some well-founded scandals.

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  • Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 266-279.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:266-279
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.09.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas, 2015. "Just hire your spouse! Evidence from a political scandal in Bavaria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 42-54.
    2. David J. Acheson & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2021. "Libel Bullies, Defamation Victims, and Litigation Incentives," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(2), pages 135-166.
    3. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    4. Wioletta Dziuda & William G. Howell, 2021. "Political Scandal: A Theory," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 197-209, January.
    5. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020. "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 240-271.
    6. Louis-Sidois, Charles & Mougin, Elisa, 2023. "Silence the media or the story? Theory and evidence of media capture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Media and democracy; Corruption; Defamation; Chilling effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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