IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v90y2017icp141-144.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A lemma in open sequential voting by veto

Author

Listed:
  • Novikova, Natalia M.
  • Pospelova, Irina I.

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the investigation of intuitively rational choice in a hierarchical game that is a model of election by open sequential veto-voting. Casting a veto against voter’s least preferred alternative (among remaining ones) may not lead to a sophisticated equilibrium. It means that sincere choice (being intuitive) is not rational. There arises the problem of finding conditions under which a sophisticated optimal sequence of actions is intuitively rational. We prove that in the case of strict preference ordering of alternatives, there exists an intuitively rational sophisticated optimal sequence. In the sequence, each voter vetoes an alternative less preferred than the sophisticated equilibrium outcome. Thus, only intuitively rational strategies are to be considered, although complete information about voters’ preferences is still needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Novikova, Natalia M. & Pospelova, Irina I., 2017. "A lemma in open sequential voting by veto," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 141-144.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:141-144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489617301038
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mueller, Dennis C., 1978. "Voting by veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-75, August.
    2. Peter Ordeshook & Olga Shvetsova, 1995. "If Hamilton and Madison were merely lucky, what hope is there for Russian federalism?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 107-126, June.
    3. Sotskov, Alexander, 1994. "Vetoing in social choice with blockings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 203-216, April.
    4. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-177, February.
    5. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
    6. Fany Yuval, 2002. "Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 343-369, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sauermann, Jan & Beckmann, Paul, 2019. "The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 90-102.
    2. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
    4. Van der Linden, Martin, 2017. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 111-121.
    5. Dan S. Felsenthal, 2017. "Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno Frey," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 195-200, November.
    6. Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2021. "Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining," Post-Print halshs-03196999, HAL.
    7. Dennis Mueller, 1999. "Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 119-148, June.
    8. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Holzman, Ron & Moulin, Hervé, 2023. "On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    9. Jan Sauermann, 2021. "The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 1-20, January.
    10. Anna bogomolnaia Ron Holzman Herve Moulin, 2021. "Wost Case in Voting and Bargaining," Papers 2104.02316, arXiv.org.
    11. Fany Yuval, 2002. "Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 343-369, December.
    12. Bruno Frey, 2011. "Tullock challenges: happiness, revolutions, and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 269-281, September.
    13. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
    14. Joe Oppenheimer, 1985. "Public choice and three ethical properties of politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 241-255, January.
    15. Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An experimental study of storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 123-154, October.
    16. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2022. "Compromising on compromise rules," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 95-112, March.
    17. Le Breton, Michel, 2016. "The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox," TSE Working Papers 16-619, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    18. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
    19. Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1996. "Protective Behavior in Games," Other publications TiSEM 0f0d5aed-021d-45d8-9776-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Mbih, Boniface & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2008. "Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1232-1242, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:141-144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.