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Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem

Author

Listed:
  • Chun, Youngsub
  • Mitra, Manipushpak
  • Mutuswami, Suresh

Abstract

We characterize all anonymous VCG mechanisms by using queue efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. By additionally imposing independence axioms, introduced by Chun (2006a) and Maniquet (2003), we characterize the pivotal and the reward-based pivotal mechanisms in the class of k-pivotal mechanisms. We generalize the independence axioms to characterize the class of k-pivotal mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2014. "Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 62-66.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:72:y:2014:i:c:p:62-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "No-envy in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 151-162, September.
    2. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.
    3. Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March.
    4. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2014. "Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 425-442, June.
    5. KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2010. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 220-232, January.
    6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    7. Chun, Youngsub, 2006. "A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 171-181, March.
    8. Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2011. "Group strategyproofness in queueing models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 242-254, May.
    9. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    10. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    11. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017. "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 462-476.
    2. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2018. "Fairness in group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 35-40.
    3. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017. "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 65-87, June.
    4. Yengin, Duygu & Chun, Youngsub, 2020. "No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 87-97.

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