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A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination

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  • Woeginger, Gerhard J.

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  • Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2003. "A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-354, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:46:y:2003:i:3:p:347-354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    2. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 151-155, March.
    3. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 1998. "Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 51, pages 29-48.
    4. repec:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:02 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
    2. Jac C. Heckelman, 2023. "Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 125-132, February.

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