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Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights

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  • Glomm, Gerhard
  • Lagunoff, Roger D.

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  • Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger D., 1995. "Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 245-261, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:3:p:245-261
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger D. Lagunoff, "undated". ""Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores''," CARESS Working Papres 95-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    3. Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1999. "On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 409-427.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-933, July.
    5. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    6. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    7. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
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