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Rational Voters, Elections, and Central Banks: Do Representative Democracies Need Nonrepresentative Institutions?

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  • Lippi, Francesco
  • Swank, Otto H.

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  • Lippi, Francesco & Swank, Otto H., 1999. "Rational Voters, Elections, and Central Banks: Do Representative Democracies Need Nonrepresentative Institutions?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 515-525, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:21:y:1999:i:4:p:515-525
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    4. Swank, O H, 1993. "Popularity Functions Based on the Partisan Theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 339-356, April.
    5. Minford, Patrick, 1995. "Time-Inconsistency, Democracy, and Optimal Contingent Rules," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 195-210, April.
    6. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
    7. Swank, O.T., 1992. "Rational Voters in Partisanship Model," Papers 9222-p, Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-1153, December.
    9. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caleiro, António, 2007. "What Does Economics Assume About People’s Knowledge? Who knows?," EconStor Preprints 142776, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    2. Lippi, Francesco, 2000. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 323-338, December.
    3. Adriel Jost, 2018. "Cultural Differences in Monetary Policy Preferences," Working Papers 2018-02, Swiss National Bank.

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