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Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China

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  • Agarwal, Sumit
  • Qian, Wenlan
  • Seru, Amit
  • Zhang, Jian

Abstract

Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.

Suggested Citation

  • Agarwal, Sumit & Qian, Wenlan & Seru, Amit & Zhang, Jian, 2020. "Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 430-450.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:137:y:2020:i:2:p:430-450
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.002
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    3. Long Wang & Yang Yang, 2021. "Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 7-35, March.
    4. Hanming Fang, 2024. "Measurements, determinants, causes, and consequences of corruption: lessons from China’s anti-corruption campaign," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 3-25, February.
    5. Agarwal, Sumit & Han, Yajie & Qin, Yu & Zhu, Hongjia, 2023. "Disguised pollution: Industrial activities in the dark," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    6. Yi Huang & Marco Pagano & Ugo Panizza, 2020. "Local Crowding‐Out in China," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 2855-2898, December.
    7. Chen, Deqiu & Ma, Yujing & Martin, Xiumin & Michaely, Roni, 2022. "On the fast track: Information acquisition costs and information production," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(2), pages 794-823.
    8. Bu, Di & Hanspal, Tobin & Liao, Yin, 2022. "Political corruption, trust, and household stock market participation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    9. Zhang, Man & Zhang, Zhiying & Tian, Xiujuan, 2023. "Social identity of civil servants and online peer-to-peer lending: Evidence from China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    10. Yu Fengyan & Zhang Hongjuan & Justin Tan & Liang Qi, 2022. "Non‐Market Strategies and Credit Benefits: Unpacking Heterogeneous Political Connections in Response to Government Anti‐Corruption Initiatives," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 349-389, March.
    11. Han, Xun & Hsu, Sara & Li, Jianjun & An, Ran, 2023. "Economic policy uncertainty, non-financial enterprises' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    12. John M. Griffin & Clark Liu & Tao Shu, 2022. "Is the Chinese Anticorruption Campaign Authentic? Evidence from Corporate Investigations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7248-7273, October.
    13. Fan, Gang-Zhi & Li, Han & Li, Jiangyi & Zhang, Jian, 2022. "Housing property rights, collateral, and entrepreneurship: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    14. Cao, Zhengyu & Wang, Rundong & Xiao, Xinrong & Yin, Chengxi, 2023. "Disseminating information across connected firms — Analyst site visits can help," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 510-531.
    15. Yiyuan Ma & Youzhi Xiao, 2022. "The Substitution Effect of Chinese Anti-Corruption “Alcohol Ban”," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(12), pages 1-13, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Credit cards; Credit; Debt; Household finance; Government; Bureaucrats; Banking; Political connections; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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