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Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction

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Dow James
Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 64 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 305-324
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:2:p:305-324

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  1. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard Schipper, 2008. "Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 333-362, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marcello Basili & Alain Chateauneuf & Fulvio Fontini, 2004. "Choices under ambiguity with familiar and unfamiliar outcomes," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04115, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Nick Vikander, 2009. "The Breakdown of Morale," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-027/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2004. "Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," KIER Working Papers 583, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kin Chung Lo, 1998. "Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs," Working Papers 1998_02, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Takao Asano, 2004. "Portfolio Inertia under Ambiguity," ISER Discussion Paper 0609, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 2000. "A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 376, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  11. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2003. "Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-27, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Equilibrium in Beliefs Under Uncertainty," Working Papers ecpap-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. GHIRARDATO, Paolo & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Choquet rationality," CORE Discussion Papers 1999012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  14. Peter Klibanoff, 1998. "Stochastic Independence and Uncertainty Aversion," Discussion Papers 1212, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  15. David Dequech, 2006. "Towards An Alternative To The Game-Theoretic Concept Of Conventions," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 77, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  16. Andreas Lehnert & Wayne Passmore, 1999. "Pricing systemic crises: monetary and fiscal policy when savers are uncertain," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1999-33, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  17. Roman Kozhan & Michael Zarichnyi, 2008. "Nash equilibria for games in capacities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 321-331, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Takao Asano, 2004. "Portfolio Inertia and [Epsilon]-Contaminations," ISER Discussion Paper 0610, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  19. Sujoy Mukerji & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1011-1011. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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