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Reputation in repeated second-price auctions

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Author Info
Bikhchandani, Sushil

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 46 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 97-119
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:46:y:1988:i:1:p:97-119

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  1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Marco Pagnozzi, 2006. "Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions?," CSEF Working Papers 169, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 15-16, pages 11, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. ALBANO, Gian Luigi & JOUNEAU, FrŽfŽric, 1998. "A Bayesian approoach to the econometrics of first-price auctions," CORE Discussion Papers 1998031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  5. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Market Design with Correlated Valuations," Working Papers 1034, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. LOVO, Stefano M. & CALCAGNO, R., 2001. "Market efficiency and Price Formation when Dealers are Asymmetrically Informed," Les Cahiers de Recherche 737, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Gian Albano & Frédéric Jouneau-Sion, 2004. "Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions," TEST: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 193-211, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2006. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning With Testable Implications," Working Papers 390, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Alexander Dilger, 2006. "Forced to make mistakes: Reasons for complaining about Bebchuk's scheme and other market-oriented insolvency procedures," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 79-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sushil Bikhchandani & John G. Riley, 1988. "A Characterization of Equilibria in Common Value Second-Price and Open-Exit Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 474, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Reinhard Selten, 2001. "An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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