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Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

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Eraslan, Hulya

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 103 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 11-30
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:11-30

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