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On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion

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  • Congleton, Roger D.
  • Fudulu, Paul

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  • Congleton, Roger D. & Fudulu, Paul, 1996. "On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 133-136, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:30:y:1996:i:1:p:133-136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March.
    2. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March.
    3. Veblen, Thorstein, 1899. "The Theory of the Leisure Class," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number veblen1899.
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