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Abuse of power

Author

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  • Hoeft, Leonard
  • Mill, Wladislaw

Abstract

Punishment institutions are a major guarantor of prosocial behavior. At the same time, their asymmetrical power structure may lead to antisocial behavior itself. We investigate power abuse, understood as the use of power for personal gain, of a single punisher in a public-goods game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. Using a laboratory experiment we find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoeft, Leonard & Mill, Wladislaw, 2024. "Abuse of power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 305-324.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:220:y:2024:i:c:p:305-324
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.02.003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Power; Corruption; Hypocrisy; Punishment; Transparency; Public-goods game; Designated punishment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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