IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v215y2023icp490-499.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intermediated corruption under asymmetric punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Hu, Lin
  • Oak, Mandar

Abstract

Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries who help citizens and businesses navigate the complexities of government regulatory procedures can also facilitate bribery. Moreover, it has been argued that traditional methods of detecting bribery may be ineffective in the presence of intermediaries. This paper investigates whether asymmetric punishment (viz., punishing bribe taking, but not giving) can reduce bribery when both intermediated as well direct corruption are possible and the complexity of the regulatory process is endogenous. We show that if asymmetric punishment can induce whistle blowing, then a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment can result in fewer bribery transactions, a reduction in regulatory complexity, and an increase in clients' gain from regulatory approvals.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Lin & Oak, Mandar, 2023. "Intermediated corruption under asymmetric punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 490-499.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:215:y:2023:i:c:p:490-499
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268123003542
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.032?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:oup:alecon:v:18:y:2016:i:2:p:506-556. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Elton Dusha, 2015. "Intermediated Corruption," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(3), pages 997-1017, August.
    3. Basu, Kaushik, 2011. "Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe should be Treated as Legal," MPRA Paper 50335, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Elton Dusha, 2015. "Intermediated Corruption," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56, pages 997-1017, August.
    5. Perrotta Berlin, Maria & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Qin, Bei, 2015. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," SITE Working Paper Series 34, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 25 May 2017.
    6. Mandar Oak, 2015. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 580-604, August.
    7. Malay Biswas, 2017. "Are They Efficient in the Middle? Using Propensity Score Estimation for Modeling Middlemen in Indian Corporate Corruption," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 563-586, March.
    8. Gautam Bose, 2010. "Aspects of Bureaucratic Corruption," Discussion Papers 2010-14, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    9. Güzin Bayar, 2005. "The role of intermediaries in corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 277-298, March.
    10. Abbink, Klaus & Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Jain, Tarun, 2014. "Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 17-28.
    11. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2009. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 45-57, April.
    12. Fan Liangcong & Ying Zechun & Yuan Yuemei & Zhang Xinchao & Xu Bin, 2019. "How Do Intermediaries Affect the Effectiveness of the Four-Eyes-Principle? An Experimental Investigation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(4), pages 1-13, October.
    13. Christoph Engel & Sebastian J. Goerg & Gaoneng Yu, 2016. "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 506-556.
    14. Martin Dufwenberg & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Legalizing Bribe Giving," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 836-853, April.
    15. Lin Hu & Mandar Oak, 2023. "Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, January.
    16. Fredriksson, Anders, 2014. "Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 256-273.
    17. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
    18. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2014. "Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 78-99, March.
    19. Karna Basu & Kaushik Basu & Tito Cordella, 2016. "Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(6), pages 831-856, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lin Hu & Mandar Oak, 2023. "Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, January.
    2. Dmitriy Knyazev, 2023. "How to fight corruption: Carrots and sticks," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 413-429, April.
    3. Jun Hu, 2021. "Asymmetric punishment, Leniency and Harassment Bribes in China: a selective survey," Working Papers hal-03119491, HAL.
    4. Perrotta Berlin, Maria & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Qin, Bei, 2015. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," SITE Working Paper Series 34, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 25 May 2017.
    5. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Radoniqi, Fatos, 2023. "Republic of beliefs: An experimental investigation✰," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 30-43.
    6. Sergey V. Popov, 2016. "On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Economics Working Papers 16-04, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.
    7. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty corruption and citizen feedback," Working Papers 2015/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    8. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.
    9. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Corruption and Hold-Up: The Role of Intermediaries," Department of Economics Working Papers 12/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    10. Basu,Kaushik, 2015. "The republic of beliefs : a new approach to ?law and economics?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7259, The World Bank.
    11. Gamba, Astrid & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2018. "Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 79-88.
    12. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Radoniqi, Fatos, 2021. "Republic of Beliefs: An Experimental Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 14130, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    14. Karna Basu & Kaushik Basu & Tito Cordella, 2016. "Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(6), pages 831-856, December.
    15. Abbink, Klaus & Wu, Kevin, 2017. "Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-272.
    16. Maria Vittoria Levati & Chiara Nardi, 2019. "The power of words in a petty corruption experiment," Working Papers 18/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    17. Buckenmaier, Johannes & Dimant, Eugen & Mittone, Luigi, 2020. "Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 296-313.
    18. Astrid Gamba & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo, 2016. "Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def039, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    19. Kaushik Basu, 2018. "A short history of India's economy: A chapter in the Asian drama," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-124, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    20. Mandar Oak, 2015. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 580-604, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Asymmetric punishment; Intermediary; Red tape;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:215:y:2023:i:c:p:490-499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.