IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v65y2021ics0144818820301824.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tailoring critical loss to the competitive process

Author

Listed:
  • Coate, Malcolm B.
  • Ulrick, Shawn W.
  • Yun, John M.

Abstract

In 1989, Barry Harris & Joseph Simons developed a quantitative method to implement the Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test with a market-level “critical loss” analysis. The appeal of Harris & Simons’ framework is that it created a simple, intuitive approach to delineating markets—with relatively parsimonious data requirements. After over a decade of use, however, economists began to propose alternative approaches to the classic critical loss analysis—using theory to impose structure on firm-level demand. This allowed researchers to reformulate the critical loss test in terms of diversion ratios. The purpose of this paper is to discuss when the classic, market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate and when firm-level critical loss offers an important refinement. We illustrate, with a detailed example, that under certain plausible demand scenarios, a diversion-based firm-level analysis could easily reach the wrong answer on market definition. Thus, the analyst needs to carefully study the competitive environment before deciding on the appropriate analysis. As a bottom line, the choice between market-level and firm-level analysis depends on the specific factual situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Coate, Malcolm B. & Ulrick, Shawn W. & Yun, John M., 2021. "Tailoring critical loss to the competitive process," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:65:y:2021:i:c:s0144818820301824
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105969
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818820301824
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105969?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, 2008. "A Practical Guide To The Hypothetical Monopolist Test For Market Definition [Market Definition: An Analytical Overview]," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 1031-1063.
    2. Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-426, October.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    4. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Market Definition: Use and Abuse," EAG Discussions Papers 200706, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    5. Jerry Hausman & Gregory Leonard & J. Douglas Zona, 1994. "Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 143-157.
    6. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2010. "Merger Simulation In Competition Policy: A Survey," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 277-319.
    7. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Malcolm B. Coate & Mark D. Williams, 2007. "Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition," Research in Law and Economics, in: Research in Law and Economics, pages 41-58, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    9. Malcolm Coate & Joseph Simons, 2009. "Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the Confusion," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 12.
    10. Timo Autio & Jorge Padilla & Salvatore Piccolo & Pekka Sääskilahti & Lotta Väänänen, 2020. "On the Risk of Using a Firm-Level Approach to Identify Relevant Markets," CSEF Working Papers 581, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. repec:eme:rlwe11:s0193-5895(06)22003-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Whinston, Michael D., 2007. "Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2369-2440, Elsevier.
    13. Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, 2011. "The Lerner Index of Monopoly Power: Origins and Uses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 558-564, May.
    14. A. P. Lerner, 1934. "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 1(3), pages 157-175.
    15. Malcolm Coate & Joseph Simons, 2010. "Critical Loss v. Diversion Analysis: Another Attempt at Consensus," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 4.
    16. Unknown & Dennis Carlton, 2007. "Market Definition: Use and Abuse," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    17. Joseph J. Simons & Malcolm B. Coate, 2014. "United States V. H&R Block: An Illustration Of The Doj'S New But Controversial Approach To Market Definition," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 543-580.
    18. Jay Ezrielev & Joseph J. Simons, 2011. "The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Critical Loss, And Linear Demand," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 497-522.
    19. Shawn W. Ulrick & Seth B. Sacher & Paul R. Zimmerman & John M. Yun, 2020. "Defining Geographic Markets with Willingness-to-Travel Circles," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 241-284.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_024, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    3. Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    4. Zhu, Jing & Boyaci, Tamer & Ray, Saibal, 2016. "Effects of upstream and downstream mergers on supply chain profitability," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 249(1), pages 131-143.
    5. Stephen Martin, 2012. "Market Structure and Market Performance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(2), pages 87-108, March.
    6. Miller, Nathan H. & Remer, Marc & Ryan, Conor & Sheu, Gloria, 2017. "Upward pricing pressure as a predictor of merger price effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 216-247.
    7. Mathiesen, Lars & Nilsen, Øivind Anti & Sørgard, Lars, 2011. "Merger simulations with observed diversion ratios," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 83-91, June.
    8. Wang, X. Henry & Zhao, Jingang, 2022. "Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 37-49.
    9. Willem H. Boshoff, 2013. "Why define markets in competition cases?," Working Papers 10/2013, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
    10. Soo-Haeng Cho & Xin Wang, 2017. "Newsvendor Mergers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 298-316, February.
    11. Ivaldi, Marc & Verboven, Frank, 2005. "Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 669-691, December.
    12. Yan Yang, 2019. "A New Solution to Market Definition: An Approach Based on Multi-dimensional Substitutability Statistics," Papers 1906.10030, arXiv.org.
    13. Kaplow, Louis, 2021. "Horizontal merger analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    14. Claudio Agostini & Eduardo Saavedra & Manuel Willington, 2012. "Economies of Scale and Merger Efficiencies: Empirical Evidence from the Chilean Pension Funds Market," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv285, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    15. Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2008. "A Short Overview of a Methodology for the Ex-Post Review of Merger Control Decisions," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 453-475, December.
    16. Patrick Sun, 2014. "Quality Competition in Mobile Telecommunications: Evidence from Connecticut," Working Papers 14-05, NET Institute.
    17. Policarpo Garcia, Carolina & Furquim de Azevedo, Paulo, 2019. "Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 78-118.
    18. Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Gil-Molto, Maria Jose & Orts, Vicente, 2006. "Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 395-409, September.
    19. Tarantino, Emanuele & Pavanini, Nicola & Mayordomo, Sergio, 2020. "The Impact of Alternative Forms of Bank Consolidation on Credit Supply and Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 15069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Malcolm Coate & Shawn Ulrick, 2009. "Do Court Decisions Drive the Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement Policy on Merger Settlements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(2), pages 99-114, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:65:y:2021:i:c:s0144818820301824. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.