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Sequential torts and bilateral harm

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  • Friehe, Tim

Abstract

This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.

Suggested Citation

  • Friehe, Tim, 2009. "Sequential torts and bilateral harm," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 161-168, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:2:p:161-168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
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    8. Leong, Avon K., 1989. "Liability rules when injurers as well as victims suffer losses," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 105-111, June.
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    10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    11. Winter, Harold, 1994. "Sequential Torts with imperfect information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 35-40, March.
    12. Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Liability for Accidents," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 139-182, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric, 2015. "On the political economy of public safety investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 7-16.
    2. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Langlais, Eric, 2012. "Social Wealth and Optimal Care," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 271-284.
    3. Julien Jacob & Eve-Angéline Lambert & Emmanuel Peterle, 2022. "Several liability with sequential care: an experiment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 283-326, October.

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