IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/glofin/v60y2024ics1044028324000097.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do insiders profit from public environmental information? Evidence from insider trading

Author

Listed:
  • El Ghoul, Sadok
  • Fu, Zhengwei
  • Guedhami, Omrane
  • Kim, Yongwon

Abstract

We examine whether environmental costs impact the profitability of insider trading. We use a sample of 3189 purchase transactions and 10,200 sales transactions from 31 countries over 2011–2018. We uncover evidence that insiders sell their stocks profitably based on public environmental cost information. Further analysis indicates that these results become more pronounced in contexts of high investor inattention to environmental information, as measured by lower Google search frequencies for environmental information and the presence of right-leaning governments. Our findings demonstrate that insiders can benefit from publicly available environmental information and suggest that investor inattention to this information is a key driver of insider trading performance.

Suggested Citation

  • El Ghoul, Sadok & Fu, Zhengwei & Guedhami, Omrane & Kim, Yongwon, 2024. "Do insiders profit from public environmental information? Evidence from insider trading," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:60:y:2024:i:c:s1044028324000097
    DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2024.100937
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1044028324000097
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.gfj.2024.100937?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental costs; Insider trading; Investor inattention; Political ideology;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:60:y:2024:i:c:s1044028324000097. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620162 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.