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Learning by matching patterns

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  • Lambson, Val E.
  • Probst, Daniel A.

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  • Lambson, Val E. & Probst, Daniel A., 2004. "Learning by matching patterns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 398-409, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:398-409
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
    2. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
    3. Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 1990. "Iterative computation of cournot equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 61-75, March.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
    2. Lambson, Val & van den Berghe, John, 2015. "Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 516-530.

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