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Extending Nash's Axioms to Nonconvex Problems

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  • Mariotti, Marco

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  • Mariotti, Marco, 1998. "Extending Nash's Axioms to Nonconvex Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 377-383, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:22:y:1998:i:2:p:377-383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mariotti, Marco, 1994. "The Nash solution and Independence of Revealed Irrelevant Alternatives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 175-179, June.
    2. Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon, 1996. "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 26-38, March.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: Rationalizability and Nash solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 66-70.
    2. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2017. "Voting as a lottery," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 129-137.
    3. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Shuzhong Shi & Guofu Tan, 2015. "Nash bargaining for log-convex problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 413-440, April.
    4. Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 219-228.
    5. Zambrano, Eduardo, 2016. "‘Vintage’ Nash bargaining without convexity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 32-34.
    6. Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, 2012. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 851-884, November.

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