IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v142y2023icp955-977.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Kawagoe, Toshiji
  • Takizawa, Hirokazu
  • Yamamori, Tetsuo

Abstract

This study explores asymmetric volunteer dilemma games in which players incur different costs for volunteering. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that a player with less cost is more likely to contribute at the equilibrium if it is risk dominant. We have re-examined this hypothesis theoretically and experimentally and found that even when focusing on risk-dominant equilibria, the explanatory power of the theory is not universal. An econometric comparison among several behavioral models including regret aversion shows that quantal response equilibrium best explains the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu & Yamamori, Tetsuo, 2023. "Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 955-977.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:955-977
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623001598
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
    3. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    5. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    6. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-411, May.
    7. Borodin A. D., 2016. "World experience of state influence on the economy," Visnyk of National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine. Public Administration series., National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine, vol. 4(1), pages 37-43, January.
    8. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
    9. Diekmann, Andreas, 1993. "Cooperation in an Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(1), pages 75-85.
    10. Turocy, Theodore L., 2005. "A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 243-263, May.
    11. Andreas Diekmann, 1985. "Volunteer's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(4), pages 605-610, December.
    12. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Smith, Angela M., 2017. "An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 303-315.
    13. Peski, Marcin, 2010. "Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 216-248, January.
    14. Toshiji Kawagoe & Taisuke Matsubae & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2018. "Quantal response equilibria in a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma and step-level public goods games with binary decision," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 11-23, June.
    15. Michele Fioretti & Alexander Vostroknutov & Giorgio Coricelli, 2022. "Dynamic Regret Avoidance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 70-93, February.
    16. W. Brian Arthur, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning, Bounded Rationality and the Bar Problem," Working Papers 94-03-014, Santa Fe Institute.
    17. Reinhard Selten & Thorsten Chmura, 2008. "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 938-966, June.
    18. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:uea:wcbess:13-02 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Zoe Bett & Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2013. "How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-02-R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Kiran Sharma & Anamika & Anindya S. Chakrabarti & Anirban Chakraborti & Sujoy Chakravarty, 2017. "The Saga of KPR: Theoretical and Experimental developments," Papers 1712.06358, arXiv.org.
    4. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.
    5. Berger, Ulrich & De Silva, Hannelore & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, 2016. "Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 337-348.
    6. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:4:p:844-897 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bolle, Friedel, 2017. "Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 86-101.
    8. García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2020. "Non-equilibrium play in centipede games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 391-433.
    9. Todd Larson Landes & Piers Douglas Howe & Yoshihisa Kashima, 2021. "A hierarchy of mindreading strategies in joint action participation," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(4), pages 844-897, July.
    10. Kets, W., 2007. "The Minority Game : An Economics Perspective," Other publications TiSEM 65d52a6a-b27d-45a9-93a7-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Bett, Zoë & Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2016. "The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 29-34.
    12. Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, 2022. "The flip side of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 75-92, January.
    13. Külpmann, Philipp & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2022. "Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    14. Joshua Zonca & Giorgio Coricelli & Luca Polonio, 2019. "Does exposure to alternative decision rules change gaze patterns and behavioral strategies in games?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 14-25, August.
    15. Polonio, Luca & Coricelli, Giorgio, 2019. "Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 566-586.
    16. Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2016. "Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    17. Pietro Guarnieri & Lorenzo Spadoni, 2024. "Norms and anti-coordination: elicitation and priming in an El Farol Bar Game experiment," Discussion Papers 2024/303, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    18. Gabriele Chierchia & Fabio Tufano & Giorgio Coricelli, 2018. "Friends or Strangers? Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination across Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Discussion Papers 2018-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    19. García-Pola, Bernardo, 2020. "Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 82-104.
    20. Philipp Külpmann & Christoph Kuzmics, 2019. "On the Predictive Power of Theories of One-Shot Play," Graz Economics Papers 2019-09, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    21. Faillo, Marco & Smerilli, Alessandra & Sugden, Robert, 2017. "Bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 317-335.
    22. Breitmoser, Yves, 2019. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 423-447.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Volunteer's dilemma; Risk dominance; Quantal response equilibrium; The depth of reasoning; Inequity aversion; Regret aversion; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:955-977. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.