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Delegation of management authority and the level of corporate risk disclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Sun, Shuangcheng
  • Xiao, Xiaoyan

Abstract

This study reveals that delegating more power to management tends to decrease corporate risk information disclosure. The detrimental effects of this power delegation are especially significant in companies within less marketized regions and those distanced from regulatory supervision. These findings highlight the critical role of external regulators in cultivating a robust market and legal framework. Such an environment is key to developing effective corporate charter systems that can restrain management's self-interest and ensure more transparent risk disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun, Shuangcheng & Xiao, Xiaoyan, 2024. "Delegation of management authority and the level of corporate risk disclosure," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:63:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324003143
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105284
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