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Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition

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  • Gehrlein, William V.
  • Lepelley, Dominique

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  • Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1997. "Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 85-89, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:1:p:85-89
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
    2. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1981. "Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 203-210, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dominique Lepelley & William Gehrlein, 1999. "A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 85-96, February.
    2. Tigran Melkonyan & Zvi Safra, 2016. "Intrinsic Variability in Group and Individual Decision Making," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(9), pages 2651-2667, September.
    3. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.

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