Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.019
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Toeholds and Takeovers,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June.
- Bulow, Jeremy I. & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9608001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Riley, John G., 1991. "Equilibria in open common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 101-130, February.
- Theo Offerman, 2002.
"Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Klemperer, Paul, 1998. "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 757-769, May.
- Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
- Christopher Avery & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Second‐Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 573-603, September.
- Goldberg, Andrew V. & Hartline, Jason D. & Karlin, Anna R. & Saks, Michael & Wright, Andrew, 2006. "Competitive auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 242-269, May.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Andrews, Donald W.K., 1988.
"Laws of Large Numbers for Dependent Non-Identically Distributed Random Variables,"
Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 458-467, December.
- Andrews, Donald W. K., 1987. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dependent Non-Identically Distributed Random Variables," Working Papers 645, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
- Theo Offerman, 2002.
"Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 181-207, January.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003.
"Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, July.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 1999. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Virginia Economics Online Papers 337, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-044/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Hagedorn, Marcus, 2009. "The value of information for auctioneers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2197-2208, September.
- Kosmopoulou, Georgia & De Silva, Dakshina G., 2007.
"The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-313, April.
- Georgia Kosmopoulou & Dakshina G. De Silva, 2005. "The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0512002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013. "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
- Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2008. "Information Concentration in Common Value Environments," Working papers 2012-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
- Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions," Microeconomics 0511011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2019. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 423-447.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2015. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," MPRA Paper 62052, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2016. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," MPRA Paper 68981, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2015. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113160, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo, 2003. "Winner's curse without overbidding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 625-644, August.
- Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2003. "An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 295-316, September.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
- Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Shahriar, Quazi & Wooders, John, 2011. "An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 558-573, June.
- David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Marja Appelman & S. Onderstal & Joeri Gorter & Mark Lijesen & Richard Venniker, 2003. "Equal rules or equal opportunities? Demystifying level playing field," CPB Document 34, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Hongjun Zhong, 2002. "postbid market interaction and auction choice," Microeconomics 0210002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2022. "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 787-823, May.
- Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2020. "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-071/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo, 2019. "Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 218-237.
- Syngjoo Choi & Jos¢¥e-Alberto Guerra & Jinwoo Kim, 2018. "Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series no114, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
More about this item
Keywords
Common value; Average value function; Seller revenue; Worst case analysis;
All these keywords.JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:356-360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.