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Do pills poison operating performance?

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  • Danielson, Morris G.
  • Karpoff, Jonathan M.

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  • Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 2006. "Do pills poison operating performance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 536-559, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:536-559
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
    2. Comment, Robert & Schwert, G. William, 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-43, September.
    3. Kahle, Kathleen M. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "The Impact of Industry Classifications on Financial Research," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 309-335, September.
    4. Kathleen M. Kahle & Ralph A. Walkling, "undated". "The Impact of Industry Classifications on Financial Research," Research in Financial Economics 9607, Ohio State University.
    5. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 1998. "On the uses of corporate governance provisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 347-371, December.
    6. Barber, Brad M. & Lyon, John D., 1996. "Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 359-399, July.
    7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, 2002. "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy," NBER Working Papers 8974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    9. Dimson, Elroy & Marsh, Paul, 1986. "Event study methodologies and the size effect : The case of UK press recommendations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-142, September.
    10. Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1988. "Poison pill securities : Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 347-376, January.
    11. Ryngaert, Michael, 1988. "The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 377-417, January.
    12. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    13. Meulbroek, Lisa K & Mitchell, Mark L & Mulherin, J Harold & Netter, Jeffry M & Poulsen, Annette B, 1990. "Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 1108-1117, October.
    14. DeAngelo, Harry & Rice, Edward M., 1983. "Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 329-359, April.
    15. Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2002. "Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1857-1889, October.
    16. Bizjak, John M. & Marquette, Christopher J., 1998. "Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 499-521, December.
    17. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1988. "Withdrawn Security Offerings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 119-133, June.
    18. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
    19. Knoeber, Charles R, 1986. "Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 155-167, March.
    20. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H., 1989. "The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-322, December.
    21. Linn, Scott C. & McConnell, John J., 1983. "An empirical investigation of the impact of `antitakeover' amendments on common stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 361-399, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kai Wang & Kun-Kun Xue & Jin-Hua Xu & Chien-Chi Chu & Sang-Bing Tsai & He-Jun Fan & Zhen-Yu Wang & Jiangtao Wang, 2018. "How Does a Staggered Board Provision Affect Corporate Strategic Change?—Evidence from China’s Listed Companies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-13, May.
    2. Ertugrul, Mine, 2015. "Bargaining power of targets: Takeover defenses and top-tier target advisors," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 48-78.
    3. Dutordoir, Marie & Strong, Norman & Ziegan, Marius C., 2014. "Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 80-100.
    4. Conyon, Martin J. & Read, Laura E., 2006. "A model of the supply of executives for outside directorships," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 645-659, June.
    5. Harris, Oneil & Madura, Jeff, 2010. "Cause and effects of poison pill adoptions by spinoff units," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 307-330, July.
    6. Chakravarty, Sugato & Rutherford, Leann G., 2017. "Do busy directors influence the cost of debt? An examination through the lens of takeover vulnerability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 429-443.
    7. Becker-Blease, John R., 2011. "Governance and innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 947-958, September.
    8. Wei Shi & Brian L. Connelly & Robert E. Hoskisson, 2017. "External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(6), pages 1268-1286, June.
    9. Gine, Mireia & Moussawi, Rabih & Sedunov, John, 2017. "Governance mechanisms and effective activism: Evidence from shareholder proposals on poison pills," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 185-202.
    10. Kamoto, Shinsuke, 2017. "Managerial innovation incentives, management buyouts, and shareholders' intolerance of failure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 55-74.

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