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Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

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Author Info
Milgrom, Paul
Roberts, John

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Abstract

The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 58 (1990)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1255-77
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:6:p:1255-77

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