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Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy

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Author Info
Bryan Caplan (George Mason University)

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Abstract

Differences between the general public"s "positive" economic views and economists" resemble other judgemental anomalies: Laypeople and experts "systematically" disagree. I analyse this puzzle using data from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. The paper first tests and decisively rejects the hypothesis that the differences solely reflect economists" self-serving bias. Then it examines whether economists" political ideology and party loyalties explain the disagreement; if anything, this slightly increases their magnitude. The effect of economic training clearly falls but remains large after adding education to the set of control variables. Apparent biases" robustness suggests that the anomaly is real. Copyright 2002 Royal Economic Society

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Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 479 (April)
Pages: 433-458
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:479:p:433-458

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  1. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Matthew Rabin., 1995. "Moral Preferences, Moral Constraints, and Self-Serving Biases," Economics Working Papers 95-241, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Robert J. Shiller, 1996. "Why Do People Dislike Inflation?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1115, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Frey, Bruno S & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1992. "Economics and Economists: A European Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 216-20, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Caplan, Bryan, 2001. "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(1), pages 3-26.
  8. Babcock, Linda & Wang, Xianghong & Lowenstein, George, 1996. "Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-19, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Eichenberger, Reiner & Serna, Angel, 1996. " Random Errors, Dirty Information, and Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(1-2), pages 137-56, January.
  10. Caplan, Bryan, 2001. " Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 311-31, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Troesken, Werner, 1997. "The," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-25, April.
  12. Fremling, Gertrud M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1996. "The Bias towards Zero in Aggregate Perceptions: An Explanation Based on Rationally Calculating Individuals," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(2), pages 276-95, April.
  13. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fuchs, Victor R, 1996. "Economics, Values, and Health Care Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 1-24, March.
  15. Shiller, Robert J & Boycko, Maxim & Korobov, Vladimir, 1991. "Popular Attitudes toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 385-400, June.
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  1. Heinemann, Friedrich & Tanz, Benjamin, 2008. "The Impact of Trust on Reforms," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-053, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bryan Caplan, 2004. "George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 260-262, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bryan Caplan, 2006. "Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 91-107, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Klein, Daniel B. & Stern, Charlotta, 2005. "Narrow-Tent Democrats and Fringe Others: The Policy Views of Social Science Professors," Working Paper Series 8/2005, Swedish Institute for Social Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dan Fuller & Doris Geide-Stevenson, 2007. "Consensus on Economic Issues: A Survey of Republicans, Democrats, and Economists," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 81-94, Winter. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mohl, Philipp & Heinemann, Friedrich & Osterloh, Steffen, 2008. "Who's afraid of an EU tax and why? : revenue system preferences in the European Parliament," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-027, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2005. "(Why) Are Economists Different?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Stern, Charlotta & Klein, Daniel B., 2006. "Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members," Working Paper Series 6/2006, Swedish Institute for Social Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Clifford Winston, Government Failure versus Market Failure," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 325-328, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant, 2004. "Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy," Public Economics 0401002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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