(VF)À partir d’un échantillon de 423 entreprises françaises observées sur la période 1999-2000, nous montrons que l’existence d’une séparation entre la propriété du capital et le contrôle des votes, ou d’un contrôle pyramidal ne dissuade pas les analystes de suivre une société. L’erreur de prévision augmente avec l’écart entre les pourcentages de contrôle et de capital de l’actionnaire le plus important. Les analystes ne pourraient satisfaire les besoins informationnels des actionnaires minoritaires que de façon imprécise. Les analystes semblent, enfin, éviter les entreprises au contrôle concentré. Mais quand ils les suivent, ils se trompent peu dans leurs estimations.(VA)Using a sample of 423 French listed firms for the 1999-2000 period, we document that analysts are more inclined to follow firms with a high discrepancy level between ownership and control as well as those controlled through pyramiding. This result is consistent with the argument that minority shareholders ask for more analyst services in response to high expropriation likelihood levels. Besides, we show that increased analyst coverage does not come along with better forecast quality in these firms. Potentially poor internal governance seems to distort the precision of the forecasts.
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Volume (Year): 9 (2006) Issue (Month): 3 (September) Pages: 5-38 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:9:y:2006:i:q3:p:5-38
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