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How does relationship-based governance accommodate new entrants? Evidence from the cycle-rickshaw rental market

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  • JAIN, TARUN
  • SOOD, ASHIMA

Abstract

Relationship-based contract enforcement is commonly thought to limit market expansion. In contrast, this paper illustrates how relationship-based contract governance accommodates new entrants into market exchange using a case study of the cycle-rickshaw rental market in a city in central India. Migrants face a higher penalty for default that introduces a gap between the ex ante risk for out-of-network agents and the ex post risk. As a result, cycle-rickshaw owners are more likely to rent to migrants and migrants are more likely to participate in rental contracts. With primary data on multidimensional measures of migrant status, we confirm that migrant status is a significant predictor of rental contract participation, even controlling for other variables that moderate the rickshaw driver's ability to own a cycle-rickshaw. Our findings thus introduce a new perspective into current understandings of relationship-based contract governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jain, Tarun & Sood, Ashima, 2017. "How does relationship-based governance accommodate new entrants? Evidence from the cycle-rickshaw rental market," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 673-697, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:13:y:2017:i:03:p:673-697_00
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    Cited by:

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    2. Karthikeya Naraparaju, 2014. "Impediments to Contract Enforcement in Day Labour Markets: A Perspective from India," Working Papers id:6332, eSocialSciences.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population

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