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Estimación del voto estratégico en elecciones parlamentarias chilenas 2013

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  • Ricardo Troncoso Sepúlveda

Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo es estimar y analizar el comportamiento del voto estratégico en Chile, en el marco de las elecciones parlamentarias 2013, utilizando un modelo de votación sofisticada para distinguir votación estratégica y sincera a partir de variables que capturan el costo de oportunidad de votar por la primera preferencia, cuando esta no tiene opciones de triunfar. Los resultados sitúan el voto estratégico en torno al 3,6 % y reflejan que al momento de tomar una decisión de voto, los individuos tienen en consideración el costo de oportunidad de un sufragio “perdido” en términos de utilidad esperada. ****** This paper estimates and assesses strategic voting behaviors in Chile, in the context of the 2013 parliamentary elections, using a sophisticated voting model to distinguish strategic and sincere voting through variables that capture the opportunity cost of voting for the first candidate, when this candidate has no chance of success. The results place strategic voting at 3.6 % and reflect that when making voting decisions, individuals consider the opportunity cost of a “lost” vote in terms of expected return. ****** Este artigo estima e analisa o comportamento do voto estratégico no Chile, no contexto das eleicoes parlamentares de 2013, utilizando um sofisticado modelo de votacao para distinguir o voto estratégico e sincero através das variáveis que captura o custo de oportunidade do voto pelo primei- ro candidato, quando este nao tem chance de sucesso. Os resultados colocam o voto estratégico em torno de 3,6% e refletem que, ao tomar uma decisao de voto, os indivíduos levam em consideracao o custo de oportunidade de um voto “perdido” em termos de retorno esperado.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Troncoso Sepúlveda, 2019. "Estimación del voto estratégico en elecciones parlamentarias chilenas 2013," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, vol. 27(1), pages 169-184, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000180:017730
    DOI: 10.18359/rfce.3509
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voto estratégico; Modelo de votación sofisticada; Votación sincera; Costos de oportunidad;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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