Les enjeux du triple mandat de la BCE

The prevailing consensus on the role of central banks has eroded. The pursuit of the goal of price stability only is now insufficient to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability. A new paradigm emerges in which central banks should ensure price stability, growth and financial stability. Recent institutional developments of the ECB go in this direction since it will be in charge of the micro-prudential supervision. In addition, the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area shows that the ECB also remained attentive to the evolution of economic growth. But if the ECB implements its triple mandate, the question of the proper relationship between these missions still arises. Coordination between the different actors in charge of monetary policy, financial regulation and fiscal policy is paramount and is lacking in the current architecture. Besides, certain practices should be clarified. The ECB has played a role as lender of last resort (towards banks and, to a lesser extent, towards governements) although this mission was not allocated to the ECB. Finally, in this new framework, the ECB suffers from a democratic illegitimacy, reinforced by the increasing role it plays in determining the macroeconomic and financial balance of the euro area. It seems important that the ECB is more explicit with regard to its different objectives and that it fulfils the conditions for close cooperation with the budgetary authorities and financial regulators. Finally, we call for the ex nihilo creation of a supervisory body of the ECB, which responsibility would be to discuss and analyze the relevance of the ECB monetary policy.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)