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Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale : une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public

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  • Claudia Keser
  • Jean-Louis Rullière
  • Marie Claire Villeval

Abstract

When collective agreements apply to all unionised and non-unionised employees, what is the rationale behind joining a union? Thepaper presents an experiment on a two-stage game. Inthe first stage, the decision to join a union is modelled as a voluntary contribution to a public good. Inthe second stage, the unionised employees bargain with the employer over wages that will then be paid to all unionised and non-unionised employees. Theexperimental evidence reveals that: i) union membership is higher than predicted by theory, but it declines over time, ii) the employees?bargaining power increases with the size of the union but not as much as predicted.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Keser & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale : une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(3), pages 81-92.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_164_0081
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    1. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
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    6. Corneo, Giacomo G., 1997. "The theory of the open shop trade union reconsidered," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 71-84, March.
    7. Booth, Alison L & Chatterji, Monojit, 1995. "Union Membership and Wage Bargaining When Membership is Not Compulsory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(429), pages 345-360, March.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
    9. Keser, Claudia, 1997. "SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-24, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    10. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
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