IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/eucflr/v15y2018i2p308-338n5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Protectionism and the EU Market for Corporate Control: Is It Possible to Get the Best of Both Worlds?

Author

Listed:
  • Mukwiri Jonathan

    (Durham Law School, Durham UniversityDurham UniversityDurham Law SchoolDurhamUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Abstract

Recent reports of the Commission and the European Parliament have revisited the concerns of protectionism in the EU. This article discusses these concerns in light of the liberal and protectionist divide in the EU market for corporate control, focusing on the board neutrality rule during takeovers. The arguments advanced in this article are threefold. First, that liberal markets are likely to encourage takeovers, but breed short-termism. Second, that protectionist markets are likely to discourage takeovers, but facilitate long-termism. Third, that short-termism in the UK and the so-called protectionism in Germany are the result of entrenched policy choices made in those jurisdictions in regard to the interests they protect in regulating the market for corporate control. The article draws a conclusion that it is hard for the UK and Germany to get the best of both worlds, that is, the liberal market and long-termism.

Suggested Citation

  • Mukwiri Jonathan, 2018. "Protectionism and the EU Market for Corporate Control: Is It Possible to Get the Best of Both Worlds?," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 308-338, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:15:y:2018:i:2:p:308-338:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ecfr-2018-0011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2018-0011
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/ecfr-2018-0011?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:15:y:2018:i:2:p:308-338:n:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.