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Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean?

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  • Milyo Jeffrey

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

When I was a boy, my family would occasionally receive tall baskets filled with fruits, nuts and jams, most often around the holidays. These gifts from business acquaintances of my father were not meant to be inducements for him to break the law; rather, they were little niceties intended to maintain ongoing relationships. Today, when my wife and I are invited to dinner, we usually bring flowers or a bottle of wine as a gift. This is not some crass attempt on our part to ensure that sanitary conditions are maintained during meal preparation; it is only a symbol of our appreciation for the kindness of our hosts. Not for a moment do I believe that we would be ostracized should we go to dinner engagements empty-handed, nor would my father have punished nongivers. As such, these gift exchanges can be seen as epiphenomena: they symbolize underlying relationships, but they do not constitute relationships.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Milyo Jeffrey, 2002. "Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean?," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-4, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:2:n:3
    DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1035
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    Cited by:

    1. Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Lobbying costs and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 126-136, March.
    2. Thornburg, Steven & Roberts, Robin W., 2008. "Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 229-248.
    3. John M. de Figueiredo, 2009. "Integrated Political Strategy," NBER Working Papers 15053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Lake, James, 2015. "Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 86-101.

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