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Contingent Commissions and the Management of the Independent Agency

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  • Robert Puelz

Abstract

Insurance agencies continue to exist as an important distribution mechanism because they give their contracting insurers advantages in risk selection and enable insurance applicants to transfer complex risks. While independent agencies are compensated by upfront commissions, a key component of their profitability is tied to contingent commissions. A contingency arrangement represents ex post compensation normally tied to underwriting profitability, volume, and annual growth. We report two actual contingency contracts in the context of a decision process for choosing among contingency offerings by insurers. We incorporate both uncertainty and correlation among key variables to arrive at values for competing contracts, then use a downside risk approach that helps agency owners select the better contract. The approach offered in this article is scalable to a selection problem for any number of contingency arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Puelz, 2016. "Contingent Commissions and the Management of the Independent Agency," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 225-248, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rmgtin:v:19:y:2016:i:2:p:225-248
    DOI: 10.1111/rmir.12060
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lukas Stricker & Joël Wagner & Angela Zeier Röschmann, 2023. "The Future of Insurance Intermediation in the Age of the Digital Platform Economy," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(9), pages 1-32, August.

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