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Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market

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  • Masatomo Suzuki
  • Yasushi Asami

Abstract

In Japan, tenants are protected in the sense that owners must compensate them for evicting them against their will, while owners cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If owners cannot specify the term of a lease, social inefficiency emerges: (i) detached houses owned by individual households remain vacant for a certain period; (ii) alternatively, landlords’ newly constructed apartments, which are free from eviction risk, accommodate a large proportion of tenants; and (iii) the apartments are rebuilt frequently even though they remain viable. If a fixed‐term contract is available, only short‐term tenants choose it, and the information asymmetry is dissolved, realizing social efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Masatomo Suzuki & Yasushi Asami, 2020. "Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1074-1095, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:48:y:2020:i:4:p:1074-1095
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12205
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    Cited by:

    1. Suzuki, Masatomo & Asami, Yasushi & Shimizu, Chihiro, 2021. "Housing rent rigidity under downward pressure: Unit-level longitudinal evidence from Tokyo," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    2. Suzuki, Masatomo & Kawai, Kohei & Shimizu, Chihiro, 2022. "Discrimination against the atypical type of tenants in the Tokyo private rental housing market: Evidence from moving-in inspection and rent arrear records," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).
    3. Sidong Zhao & Weiwei Li & Kaixu Zhao & Ping Zhang, 2021. "Change Characteristics and Multilevel Influencing Factors of Real Estate Inventory—Case Studies from 35 Key Cities in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-29, September.

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