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What drives program terminations for the federal government?

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  • Stuart Kasdin
  • Anthony McCann

Abstract

Do federal program terminations result from politics or program ineffectiveness? We used mixed methods, starting with a survey of current and former budget officials and staffers in the Office of Management and Budget, Appropriations Committees, and other Congressional committees. We followed this up using OMB budget data and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). Consistent with the survey results, the President's Budget request did have an impact. Political events, particularly changes in party control of Congress, also had an impact. The influence of performance information was less clear: The PART evaluations did not seem to influence the likelihood of terminations.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart Kasdin & Anthony McCann, 2022. "What drives program terminations for the federal government?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 28-44, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:42:y:2022:i:1:p:28-44
    DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12288
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christopher R. Berry & Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, 2010. "After Enactment: The Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-253.
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