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Municipal reliance on fine and fee revenues: How local courts contribute to extractive revenue practices in US cities

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  • Siân Mughan

Abstract

By altering the distribution of fine and fee revenues, municipal courts provide a mechanism through which cash‐strapped city governments can increase revenues flowing into city budgets. Using a unique municipal court data set combined with city‐level financial information, this paper exploits state‐level differences in laws enabling municipal courts and differences in property tax effort across states to explore the relationship between local courts, fine and fee revenues, and municipal finances. I find that cities with municipal courts raise more fine and fee revenue than cities without a court; in cities with a court, reliance on these revenues decreases as per capita property tax yields increase; and these effects are more pronounced in cities in the bottom quartile of the population distribution. Taken together, results suggest that cities use municipal courts to fund the general operations of government and smaller cities and those with low property tax collections are more likely to do so.

Suggested Citation

  • Siân Mughan, 2021. "Municipal reliance on fine and fee revenues: How local courts contribute to extractive revenue practices in US cities," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 22-44, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:41:y:2021:i:2:p:22-44
    DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12277
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2009. "Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 71-90, February.
    2. Baicker, Katherine & Jacobson, Mireille, 2007. "Finders keepers: Forfeiture laws, policing incentives, and local budgets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2113-2136, December.
    3. Skidmore, Mark, 1999. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships between State and Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 77-102, April.
    4. Rivers, Mary Jean & Yates, Barbara M., 1997. "City size and geographic segmentation in the municipal bond market," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 633-645.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thai V Le & Matthew M Young, 2023. "Regressive revenue sourcing by local governments," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 60(5), pages 811-828, April.
    2. Foster Kamanga & Virginia Smercina & Barbara G. Brents & Daniel Okamura & Vincent Fuentes, 2021. "Costs and Consequences of Traffic Fines and Fees: A Case Study of Open Warrants in Las Vegas, Nevada," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-25, November.

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