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The Implosion of the Federal Budget Process: Triggers, Commissions, Cliffs, Sequesters, Debt Ceilings, and Shutdown

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  • Roy T. Meyers

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  • Roy T. Meyers, 2014. "The Implosion of the Federal Budget Process: Triggers, Commissions, Cliffs, Sequesters, Debt Ceilings, and Shutdown," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(4), pages 1-23, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:34:y:2014:i:4:p:1-23
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    1. Primo, David M., 2007. "Rules and Restraint," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226682594, June.
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    1. Roy T. Meyers, 2017. "Is the U.S. Congress an Insurmountable Obstacle to Any “Far-Sighted Conception of Budgeting”?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 5-24, December.

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