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International R&D Collaboration Networks

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  • HUASHENG SONG
  • VINCENT VANNETELBOSCH

Abstract

We reconsider the Goyal and Moraga‐González (Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 (2001), pp. 686–707) model of strategic networks in order to analyse how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, this conflict will occur if public spillovers are not very small. However, when governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. Indeed, a conflict will arise only if public spillovers are very small or quite large.

Suggested Citation

  • Huasheng Song & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2007. "International R&D Collaboration Networks," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 75(6), pages 742-766, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:75:y:2007:i:6:p:742-766
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01044.x
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    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
    2. Amir, Rabah, 2000. "Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1013-1032, October.
    3. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455, Elsevier.
    4. Goyal, Sanjeev & Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis, 2001. "R&D Networks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 686-707, Winter.
    5. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Hagedoorn, John, 2002. "Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and patterns since 1960," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 477-492, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kesavayuth, Dusanee & Zikos, Vasileios, 2012. "Upstream and downstream horizontal R&D networks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 742-750.
    2. Yasunori Okumura, 2012. "Spatial competition and collaboration networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 455-472, August.
    3. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    4. Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Yves Zenou, 2019. "R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics, and Policy Implications," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 476-491, July.
    5. Mitze, Timo & Naveed, Amjad & Ahmad, Nisar, 2016. "International, intersectoral, or unobservable? Measuring R&D spillovers under weak and strong cross-sectional dependence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 259-272.
    6. Fabio Di Dio & Luca Correani, 2019. "Collaboration Networks in a Hotelling Game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 127-141.
    7. Vasileios Zikos, 2010. "R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 77(1), pages 189-212, July.
    8. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    9. Lorenzo Zirulia, 2006. "Industry profit maximizing R and D networks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(1), pages 1-6.
    10. Mizuno, Keizo, 2013. "Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-43.
    11. T. Huw Edwards & Ben Ferrett & Daniel Gravino, 2020. "Inter‐firm R&D collaboration within and across national borders," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 810-826, March.
    12. Keizo Mizuno & Yasunori Okumura, 2014. "Strategic Location Choice and Network Formation for Entry," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 201-224, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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