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Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover

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  • RONALD W. ANDERSON
  • M. CECILIA BUSTAMANTE
  • STÉPHANE GUIBAUD
  • MIHAIL ZERVOS

Abstract

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade†off arises between the benefit of always having the “right†manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth†induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front†loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth†induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front†loaded compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald W. Anderson & M. Cecilia Bustamante & Stã‰Phane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(1), pages 419-464, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:73:y:2018:i:1:p:419-464
    DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12583
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    Cited by:

    1. Iwasaki, Ichiro & Ma, Xinxin & Mizobata, Satoshi, 2020. "Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    2. Wei Zhang & Xiong Xiong & Guanying Wang & Jing Li, 2022. "The accounting and trading information channels of excess control rights on IPO long-term return in China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1609-1646, November.
    3. Nopparat Wongsinhirun & Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard & Pornsit Jiraporn & Piyachart Phiromswad, 2022. "Do takeover threats influence corporate social responsibility? Evidence from hostile takeover vulnerability," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(5), pages 1203-1213, September.
    4. Sergio Foldes Guimarães & André Luiz Carvalhal Silva, 2023. "Top management team turnover in Brazil: the role of corporate governance in family-controlled companies," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(3), pages 261-273, September.
    5. Cao, Cathy Xuying & Chen, Chongyang, 2023. "CEO turnover, product market competition, and leverage policy," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    7. Hu, Xinwen & Hua, Renhai & Liu, Qingfu & Wang, Chuanjie, 2023. "The green fog: Environmental rating disagreement and corporate greenwashing," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    8. Fu, Kangkang & Kwok, Wing Chun & Wong, George, 2020. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover: A Chinese study," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
    10. Wang, Huan & Lai, Chong & Lai, Shaoyong, 2021. "A study on the incentive compensation structure with payroll tax: A continuous-time principal-agent model," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    11. Huai-Chun Lo & Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou, 2022. "The effect of CEO power on overinvestment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 23-63, July.
    12. Xiaoqiong Wang & Siqi Wei & Xiaoyang Zhu, 2024. "Economic policy uncertainty and heterogeneous institutional investor horizons," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 39-67, January.

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