Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage, authorized generics, and pay‐for‐delay deals
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DOI: 10.1111/jems.12351
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- Farasat A.S. Bokhari & Franco Mariuzzo & Arnold Polanski, 2020. "Entry limiting agreements: First mover advantage, authorized generics and pay-for-delay deals," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2015-05v4, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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