IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ijethy/v3y2007i1p47-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nonlinear taxation and punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Tommy Andersson

Abstract

The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n ≥ 3 differing individuals. It is demonstrated that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self‐selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson, 2007. "Nonlinear taxation and punishment," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 47-56, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:3:y:2007:i:1:p:47-56
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00046.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00046.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00046.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tommy Andersson, 2007. "A Note on Nonlinear Income Taxes and the Utility Possibility Set," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(5), pages 1-8.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2007:i:5:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:3:y:2007:i:1:p:47-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1742-7355 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.