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Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms

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  • Nancy H. Chau

Abstract

This paper establishes a political support model of immigration reforms. The analysis highlights the distinction between border enforcement and employer sanction measures in that the former can be more aptly characterized as an income transfer from employer to native labor interests, whereas the latter generates deadweight losses that are borne entirely by producers. We show that while amnesty may appear to run contrary to the original intent of the immigration reform, it may nevertheless facilitate rent capture by the politician by “wiping the slate clean” and reducing the deadweight loss of employer sanction measures.

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  • Nancy H. Chau, 2003. "Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 193-224, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:193-224
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Facchini, Giovanni & Testa, Cecilia, 2021. "The rhetoric of closed borders: Quotas, lax enforcement and illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Casarico, Alessandra & Facchini, Giovanni & Frattini, Tommaso, 2018. "What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 258-273.
    3. Ira N. Gang & Myeong-Su Yun, 2007. "Immigration Amnesty and Immigrant's Earnings," Research in Labor Economics, in: Immigration, pages 273-309, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.

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