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Income inequality and party alternation: State‐level evidence from the United States

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  • Peter Calcagno
  • Alexander Marsella
  • Yang Zhou

Abstract

Using multiple measures of income inequality and political party alternation for US states we examine panel data from 1971 to 2015 to test whether income inequality affects party alternation for governors. We test various measures of party alternation at the state level. The evidence suggests that income inequality increases party alternation and has a nonlinear relationship with gubernatorial‐party alternation. Income inequality backlash is more evident for Republicans and favors Democrats when inequality is high, with the opposite being true. Results vary with the choice of inequality and party alternation measures, which suggests income inequality for states should be further examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Calcagno & Alexander Marsella & Yang Zhou, 2024. "Income inequality and party alternation: State‐level evidence from the United States," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(2), pages 355-374, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:42:y:2024:i:2:p:355-374
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12641
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