IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v18y2000i4p449-460.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The appeal of voluntary environmental programs: which firms participate and why?

Author

Listed:
  • J Videras
  • A Alberini

Abstract

Why do firms participate in the EPA's voluntary environmental programs? Possible reasons include: (1) to appeal to consumers who demand ‘green’ products; (2) to preempt government regulation; (3) to seek regulatory relief from the agency; and (4) to gain a competitive advantage over competitors. This article examines the determinants of participation in voluntary environmental programs, focusing on testing hypotheses 1 and 3. To test 2, a different approach is used than in previous literature. The focus is on a specified universe of firms (manufacturing firms in the Standard & Poor 500), and their participation in each of three EPA voluntary programs (33/50, Green Lights, and WasteWi$) referring to differently regulated pollutants is analyzed. Our empirical analyses reveal that (1) publicity is an important component of participation; (2) the worse the environmental track record of the firm, the more likely the firm is to participate, but only in programs directly related to highly regulated pollutants; and (3) firms that scrutinize their environmental performance more carefully are wary of newer programs with uncertain reach of the public and uncertain benefits. Firms appear to value the information/technology transfer aspect of joining a program.

Suggested Citation

  • J Videras & A Alberini, 2000. "The appeal of voluntary environmental programs: which firms participate and why?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(4), pages 449-460, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:18:y:2000:i:4:p:449-460
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00041.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00041.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00041.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konar, Shameek & Cohen, Mark A., 1997. "Information As Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 109-124, January.
    2. Stephen J. Decanio & William E. Watkins, 1998. "Investment In Energy Efficiency: Do The Characteristics Of Firms Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 95-107, February.
    3. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Madhu Khanna, 2001. "Non‐Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 291-324, July.
    2. David Ervin & JunJie Wu & Madhu Khanna & Cody Jones & Teresa Wirkkala, 2013. "Motivations and Barriers to Corporate Environmental Management," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(6), pages 390-409, September.
    3. Daniel Matisoff, 2015. "Sources of specification errors in the assessment of voluntary environmental programs: understanding program impacts," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 48(1), pages 109-126, March.
    4. Toshi H.Arimura & Shinji Kaneko & Shunsuke Managi & Takayoshi Shinkuma & Masashi Yamamoto & Yuichiro Yoshida, 2016. "Political Economy of Voluntary Approaches: A Lesson from Environmental Policies," Working Papers e107, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    5. Helfand, Gloria E. & Berck, Peter & Maull, Tim, 2003. "The theory of pollution policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 249-303, Elsevier.
    6. Nicholas Powers & Allen Blackman & Thomas Lyon & Urvashi Narain, 2011. "Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(1), pages 131-155, September.
    7. Blackman, Allen, 2009. "Alternative Pollution Control Policies in Developing Countries: Informal, Informational, and Voluntary," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-10, Resources for the Future.
    8. Rinaldo Brau & C. Carraro, 2004. "The economic analysis of voluntary approaches to environmental protection. A survey," Working Paper CRENoS 200420, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    9. Andreas Ferrara and Ian Lange, 2014. "Voluntary Programs to Encourage Diffusion: The Case of the Combined Heat-and-Power Partnership," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    10. Wu JunJie & Wirkkala Teresa M., 2009. "Firms' Motivations for Environmental Overcompliance," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 399-433, June.
    11. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
    12. Ziegler, Andreas & Schröder, Michael, 2006. "What Determines the Inclusion in a Sustainability Stock Index? A Panel Data Analysis for European Companies," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-041, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    13. Nicholas, Powers & Blackman, Allen & Lyon, Thomas P. & Narain, Urvashi, 2008. "Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project," RFF Working Paper Series dp-08-27-efd, Resources for the Future.
    14. Anton, Wilma Rose Q., 2005. "The Choice of Management Practices: What Determines the Design of an Environmental Management System?," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19503, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    15. Eva Horváthová, 2020. "Why Do Firms Voluntarily Adopt Environmental Management Systems? The Case of the Czech Republic," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 157-168.
    16. Magali Delmas & Maria J. Montes‐Sancho & Jay P. Shimshack, 2010. "Information Disclosure Policies: Evidence From The Electricity Industry," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 483-498, April.
    17. Moulton, Kirby S. & Zwane, Alix Peterson, 2005. "Managing Environmental Risks through Private Sector Cooperation: Cooperation: Theory, Experience and a Case Study of the California Code of Sustainable Winegrowing Practices," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14.
    18. Ziegler, Andreas & Schröder, Michael, 2010. "What determines the inclusion in a sustainability stock index?: A panel data analysis for european firms," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 848-856, February.
    19. Arimura, Toshi H. & Kaneko, Shinji & Managi, Shunsuke & Shinkuma, Takayoshi & Yamamoto, Masashi & Yoshida, Yuichiro, 2019. "Political economy of voluntary approaches: A lesson from environmental policies in Japan," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 41-53.
    20. Nicole Darnall & Joann Carmin, 2005. "Greener and cleaner? The signaling accuracy of U.S. voluntary environmental programs," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 38(2), pages 71-90, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:18:y:2000:i:4:p:449-460. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.