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From Rationing to Rights: Creating a Universal Entitlement to Aged Care

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  • Stephen Duckett
  • Anika Stobart

Abstract

This article presents an argument for creating a universal entitlement to aged care. Following the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, significant reform of Australia's aged care system is needed. The current policy of rationing care must end, because it leaves too many older Australians without the level of care they need. It should be replaced with an aged care system that is underpinned by an objective to support the rights of older Australians, including their right to independently assessed, government funded, reasonable and necessary needs‐based care. This more equitable approach will require a massive boost in government spending to ensure all older Australians get the care and support they need, when they need it.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Duckett & Anika Stobart, 2021. "From Rationing to Rights: Creating a Universal Entitlement to Aged Care," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 54(2), pages 257-265, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:54:y:2021:i:2:p:257-265
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8462.12424
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
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