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Political ranking in hierarchy and receipt of a comment letter: Evidence from China

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  • Xunan Feng
  • Dengxi Wei

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of political ranking in hierarchy on the probability that a firm will receive comment letters in China. We find that state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to receive comment letters compared to non‐SOE firms, and the probability of receiving a letter is even lower for central government‐controlled firms. These results demonstrate that political hierarchy is a significant factor in determining the receipt of comment letters. In addition, alternative proxies for political ranking yield similar findings. Lastly, our further analysis suggest that the level of marketisation and media coverage can significantly influence the results, indicating that a highly developed market may alleviate the negative effect of political ranking.

Suggested Citation

  • Xunan Feng & Dengxi Wei, 2024. "Political ranking in hierarchy and receipt of a comment letter: Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 64(1), pages 277-307, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:64:y:2024:i:1:p:277-307
    DOI: 10.1111/acfi.13145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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