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Autonomia differenziata e omogeneità regionale delle preferenze. Un riscontro empirico

Author

Listed:
  • Salvatore Ercolano
  • Carmelo Petraglia
  • Domenico Scalera

Abstract

"Proposals to increase regional autonomy under examination by the Italian Parliament have been motivated by high-er allocative efficiency of decentralized supply of public services and regulatory measures based on local specific preferences and demand. According to Oates’ decentralization theorem, local homogeneity of preferences is one of the conditions for making regional supply more efficient. However, preliminary empirical evidence provided in this study suggests that in most cases the degree of regional homogeneity in preferences for the intensity and mode of public intervention is no significantly higher than that found for the country as a whole. Therefore, the condition underlying the argument for the higher allocative efficiency of regions does not appear to be grounded."

Suggested Citation

  • Salvatore Ercolano & Carmelo Petraglia & Domenico Scalera, 2024. "Autonomia differenziata e omogeneità regionale delle preferenze. Un riscontro empirico," Regional Economy, , vol. 8(Q1), pages 3-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:atk:issues:q32023:10191
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shantayanan Devarajan & Stuti Khemani & Shekhar Shah, 2009. "The Politics of Partial Decentralization," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Ronald Findlay & John D. Wilson, 1987. "The Political Economy of Leviathan," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka (ed.), Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, chapter 8, pages 289-306, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. David Bartolini & Agnese Sacchi & Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro, 2023. "Voters’ Distance, Information Bias and Politicians’ Salary," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(2), pages 637-664, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentramento; autonomia differenziata; efficienza allocativa; regioni italiane;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics

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