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A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France

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  • Jean-Michel Glachant and Dominique Finon

Abstract

We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Michel Glachant and Dominique Finon, 2005. "A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 181-204.
    • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:2005se-a08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Finon, D., 2003. "Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: The Destabilisation of a Public Hierarchy in an Open Institutional Environment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0314, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. David M. Newbery, 2002. "Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262640481, December.
    3. Paul L. Joskow, 2003. "The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the U.S," Working Papers 0308, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
    4. repec:reg:rpubli:207 is not listed on IDEAS
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    1. Colucci, Domenico & Doni, Nicola & Ricchiuti, Giorgio & Valori, Vincenzo, 2022. "Market dynamics with a state-owned dominant firm and a competitive fringe," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    2. MAHENC Philippe, 2008. "Optimal environmental taxation when green alternative is available," LERNA Working Papers 08.04.248, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    3. Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.
    4. Adrien de Hauteclocque & Yannick Perez, 2011. "Law & Economics Perspectives on Electricity Regulation," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/21, European University Institute.
    5. Martínez Chombo Eduardo, 2009. "Sources of Over-Costs and Distortions in State-Owned Utilities in Mexico," Working Papers 2009-07, Banco de México.
    6. Weigt, Hannes, 2009. "A Review of Liberalization and Modeling of Electricity Markets," MPRA Paper 65651, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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