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Reputation and Partial Default

Author

Listed:
  • Manuel Amador
  • Christopher Phelan

Abstract

This paper presents a continuous-time reputation model of sovereign debt allowing for both varying levels of partial default and full default. In it, a government can be a nonstrategic commitment type or a strategic opportunistic type, and a government's reputation is its equilibrium Bayesian posterior of being the commitment type. Our equilibrium has that for bond levels reachable by both types without defaulting, bigger partial defaults (or bigger haircuts for bond holders) imply higher interest rates for subsequent bond issuances, as in the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan, 2023. "Reputation and Partial Default," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 158-172, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:5:y:2023:i:2:p:158-72
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210739
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    Cited by:

    1. Ibrahima Diarra & Michel Guillard & Hubert Kempf, 2022. "Sovereign Defaults and Debt Sustainability: The Debt Recovery Channel," CESifo Working Paper Series 9688, CESifo.
    2. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi & Pietro Bomprezzi, 2024. "Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of Private or Official Debt Restructurings," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 72(1), pages 292-334, March.
    3. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi & Pietro Bomprezzi, 2021. "Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of a Default," Development Working Papers 475, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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