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Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

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  • Gharad Bryan
  • Dean Karlan
  • Jonathan Zinman

Abstract

Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of selection on repayment likelihood, selection on susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. Implementing our method in South Africa we find no evidence of screening but large enforcement effects. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)

Suggested Citation

  • Gharad Bryan & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2015. "Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 174-204, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:174-204
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130234
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    Cited by:

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    2. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    3. Yong Cai & Ahnaf Rafi, 2022. "On the Performance of the Neyman Allocation with Small Pilots," Papers 2206.04643, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    4. Afridi, Farzana & Dhillon, Amrita & Sharma, Swati, 2020. "The Ties That Bind Us: Social Networks and Productivity in the Factory," IZA Discussion Papers 13711, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Moina Rauf & Zahid Pervaiz, 2016. "Replacing Contracts with Handshakes: A Study of Social Networks of Entrepreneurs in the Weaving Sector," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 331-348.
    6. Gunnsteinsson, Snaebjorn, 2020. "Experimental identification of asymmetric information: Evidence on crop insurance in the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    7. M. Ali Choudhary & Anil K. Jain, 2022. "Credit access and relational contracts: An experiment testing informational and contractual frictions for Pakistani farmers," International Finance Discussion Papers 2022, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Thorsten Beck & Patrick Behr, 2017. "Individual versus Village Lending: Evidence from Montenegro," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 67-87, November.
    9. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Mitchell Hoffman & Nick Zubanov, 2023. "What Do Employee Referral Programs Do? Measuring the Direct and Overall Effects of a Management Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(3), pages 633-686.
    10. Emily Breza & Arun G. Chandrasekhar, 2015. "Social Networks, Reputation and Commitment: Evidence from a Savings Monitors Experiment," NBER Working Papers 21169, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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